INSIDE-OUT ECONOMICS · THE THETFORD WARS · BLINDSPOT
Turn your poll into an electorate
Enter the four Genially vote totals. Then find out whether revenge wins Norfolk's election.
Your Genially poll
How much would you pay for revenge?
Let it go£0
Petty revenge£2
Sweet revenge£5
Full vengeance£10
The political twist
What if revenge becomes an election promise?
PEACE
The Peace PartyCampaign: protect Norfolk’s prosperity.
PUNISH
The Revenge PartyCampaign: make Suffolk pay, even at a cost to Norfolk.
Your class has put a price on revenge. Could those preferences swing an election?
Teaching assumption: housemate revenge is a proxy for punitive voting, not evidence of support for war.
Change one political fact
How powerful is retaliation?
Damage to Suffolk per £1 spent£1
The Revenge Party targets £30 damage to Suffolk. Move right: each £1 Norfolk spends inflicts more damage, so the same retaliation costs less.
Watch the four voter groups switch
How votes switch: Each group votes Revenge when its maximum willingness to pay covers the cost: £30 ÷ damage per £1.
Live election result · 0 voters
Does revenge win?
Same electorate. Greater damage per £1 spent.
Norfolk–Suffolk · settlement opportunity curve
■ Both prefer to war (E), but not necessarily feasibleNorfolk indifference curveSuffolk indifference curveSettlement opportunity curve
The grey curve bounds what can be shared. Peace requires at least one green point on or inside that boundary.
Two countries. Two kinds of malevolence.
What if both sides enjoy hurting the other?
Norfolk hostility · α
Uᴺ = Norfolk income − α × Suffolk income
Suffolk hostility · β
Uˢ = Suffolk income − β × Norfolk income
Illustrative war incomes: E = (70,70). The grey curve marks the limit of jointly feasible incomes.
The uncomfortable verdict
WAR CAN BE RATIONAL. AND DEVASTATING.
When both sides value hurting the enemy, each may reject settlements that would make both materially richer. The mutually preferred region may no longer reach the settlement opportunity curve.
A highly destructive war can then become more likely—not because leaders miscalculate, but because their preferences reward destruction.
Who can break the deadlock?
Sometimes peace needs an outsider.
Third parties, including UN peacekeeping operations where mandated and accepted, can help monitor agreements, reduce fear and support commitments that rivals cannot sustain alone.
But there is no magic fix. Peacekeepers cannot simply erase hatred. Their effectiveness depends on mandates, consent, resources and political backing.